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TORT LAW-Landlord and Tenant-Duty of landlord to use reasonable care
to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice from passageways reserved for common use of his tenants. Sidle v. Humphrey, 220 N. E. 2d 678 (Ohio 1966).

Plaintiff's fourteen year old son, who delivered newspapers to the tenants of a multiple family dwelling, was injured in a fall down icy front steps of the dwelling. The steps
were used as a common passageway by tenants and had been
retained under the possession and control of the landlord.
It was alleged that the proximate cause of the injury was due
to ice and snow which allegedly were negligently left there
by the landlord. It was further alleged that the newsboy had
the express or implied permission of the landlord to enter
the premises. The plaintiff was given judgment by the trial
court. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that
landlords who retain possession and control of walkways and
approaches used in common by tenants in effect invite use
of these common ways by tenants and others whose relation
to tenants involves use thereof, and their duty to maintain
such common ways in a reasonably safe condition extends to
the removal of natural accumulations of ice and snow.'
When dealing with the liability of landlords in relation
to common ways and passages on the leased premises, the
courts apply the general common law rule that where the
owner of premises leases parts thereof to different tenants
and expressly or impliedly reserves other parts thereof, such
as entrances, halls, stairways, walks, etc., for the common use
of the tenants, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care to
keep safe the parts over which he reserves control. If he is
negligent in this regard, and a personal injury results by
reason thereof to a tenant or to a person there in the right of
of tenant, he is liable, provided the injury occurs while such
part of the premises is being used in the manner intended.'
Earlier cases which considered such liability uniformly held
that the landlord's common law duty of reasonable care with
respect to the maintenance of such parts of his property did
not include the duty to remove natural accumulations of snow
and ice.' This rule has become well established in Massachu1. Sidle v. Humphrey, 220 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio 1966).
2. Young v. Saroukos, 185 A.2d 274 (Del. 1962).
S. 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417d (1947); Woodley v. Bush, 272 S.W.2d
833 (Mo. 1954).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 2 [1967], Iss. 2, Art. 14

1967

CASE Nom~

493

setts, and has come to be known as the "Massachusetts" rule.'
The apparent reason for this rule is that the courts felt that
any other rule would subject a landlord to an unreasonably
harsh burden of vigilance and care.5 However, as the number
of apartment houses and multiple dwelling units increased,
there gradually arose a greater need for a rule which established a duty of landlords to remove natural accumulations
of ice and snow.
The New York courts attacked this problem in a unique
way. The courts retained the common law rule that a landlord has no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and
snow and is not liable to any person who is injured as a result of his failure to remove the natural accumulations.' But
a landlord does have the duty to remove rough and bumpy
accumulations of snow and ice, such as hummocks or ridges,
in the path of a user of a common walkway and is liable when
he creates an artificial hazard.'
The majority of the jurisdictions, however, went about
establishing this duty on the basis of one of two available
theories.
The first theory which moved toward finding a landlord's
duty of snow removal was the theory that if the landlord assumes the duty of removing natural accumulations of ice and
snow, any tenant or person on the premises in the right of
a tenant who was injured because of the landlord's failure
to remove ice and snow has a cause of action against such
landlord! The prerequisite to recovery under this theory is
proof of the fact that the landlord has assumed the duty of
removing the ice and snow.' In other words, the law would
not impose this duty under any other circumstances. This
theory is applied mainly by courts which are bound by earlier
decisions finding no duty.1"
The second theory used by courts is that the landlord's
general common law duty may, in a proper situation, include
4. Cairns v. Giumentaro, 339 Mass. 675, 162 N.E.2d 61 (1959).
5. Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 614 (1952).
6. Greenstein v. Springfield Development Corp. 22 Misc. 2d 740, 204 N.Y.S.2d
518 (1960).
7. Ibid.
8. Oswald v. Jeraj, 146 Ohio St. 676, 67 N.E.2d 779 (1946).
9. Carey v. Malley, 327 Mass. 189, 97 N.E.2d 645 (1951).
10. Annot. supra note 5, at 616.
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the duty of removing natural accumulations of ice and snow. 1
This theory is used mainly by courts which are not bound by
earlier precedent. 2 Under this theory the courts have agreed
that the duty is only to use reasonable care and there can be
no recovery for injuries unless the evidence demonstrates
that the landlord had notice of the dangerous condition and
a reasonable opportunity to correct it before the time when
the plaintiff was injured." In the case of Oswald v. Jeraj'
the court noted the conflict in decisions pertaining to landlord's duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow
from common ways. The court said that the general rule requiring a landlord to exercise reasonable care in keeping common passageways reasonably safe is the controlling theory
in relation to the duty of snow removal. The court, however,
in its actual holding on the case, used the theory that where
a landlord has assumed the duty by removing accumulations
of snow over a period of time he is liable for negligence if
he fails to remove any accumulation. In any case, the principal theory used by the courts today is the general duty which
requires a landlord to keep common passageways in a reasonably safe condition. 5
Having determined that a landlord owes a duty to remove
snow from common ways, the courts then noted that a landlord will not be liable for all injuries arising from his failure
to do so. This is because the courts have evolved the rule
that a landlord is not an insurer of everyone who comes onto
his land and uses the common passageways, even if such person is one of his tenants.1 6 The general duty imposed on
the landlord by law requires him to exercise only reasonable
care to keep the common ways safe.1 7 Therefore, a plaintiff
seeking to recover for an injury must show that the landlord
had actual or constructive notice of the presence of a dangerous accumulation of ice or snow."
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Grizzell v. Foxx, 48 Tenn. App. 462, 848 S.W.2d 815 (1960).
Annot., supra note 5.
Grizzell v. Foxx, supra note 11.
Supra note 8.
Supra note 3. In this case the court expressly declined to try the case on the
assumed duty theory, and rejected this theory in favor of the reasonable duty
theory.
16. Langhorne Road Apartments, Inc. v. Bisson, 150 S.E.2d 540 (Va. 1966).
17. PROSSER, TORTS § 61, at 419 (3d ed. 1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn.
59, 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957).
18. Grizzell v. Foxx, supra note 11.
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In Langhorne Road Apartments v. Bisson" the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that although the landlord was not
an insurer of the tenant, he was liable for the injury the
tenant suffered as the result of the failure of the landlord
to remove the snow from a sidewalk used as a common passageway. The landlord had sufficient notice of the snow
fall accumulation, since the injury occurred several hours
after the snow had begun to accumulate. Further, an agent
of the landlord had been warned by one of the tenants that
there was a dangerous accumulation of snow on the sidewalk.
In Langley Park Apartments v. Lund" the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that an accumulation of ice or
snow upon common approaches to multiple dwellings may
impose on the landlord liability for injuries therefrom provided he knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known of the existence of a dangerous condition and
failed to act within a reasonable time thereafter to protect
against injury by reason thereof.
In the principal case, the court recognized the lan'dlord's duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow
from common passageways under the theory that this duty
is included under the landlord's general duty to exercise
ordinary care in maintaining common ways in a reasonably
safe condition. In the decision of the case the court stated
that "[Generally] a landlord is not liable for injury except
such as results from his negligence with respect to parts
of devised property over which he has retained control." 1
However, the court neither discussed expressly, nor made
an issue of the requirement that a landlord must have notice
of the unsafe condition. Nor did the court make any reference
concerning the rule that a landlord is not an insurer of all
those persons rightfully using the common passageways.
The Sidle case may possibly constitute an extension of
the landlord's liability with respect to his 'duty of care in
relation to common passageways on his premises. The court
19. Supra note 16.
20. 234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 620 (1964).
21. 220 N.E.2d 678, at 684 (Ohio 1966).
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used the generally accepted theory of liability,2 yet it did
not mention the requirement of notice which has been stated
to be a prerequisite to recovery in other cases dealing with
this subject. Also, in other cases deciding the question involved in the principal case the courts have relied heavily
on the rule that a landlord is not the insurer of those persons
using the common ways. It is this rule which is primarily
responsible for limiting the liability of the landlord." The
omission of this rule from the opinion of the principal case
is worthy of special note. By omitting this rule the court
has removed the major obstacle to the establishment of a
rule of strict liability for a landlord in relation to the duty
of snow removal. With respect to this it should also be
noted that the Sidle case dealt with a common passageway
made dangerous because of natural accumulations of snow
and ice, and found a duty on the part of the landlord to
remove this snow and ice through an extension of the
common law 'duty to exercise reasonable care with respect
to common ways. The duty of snow removal was not a
part of this duty at common law. The requirement of notice
was also a part of this common law doctrine, and when the
courts extended the reasonable care rule to include snow removal, they also included the requirement of notice. The
Sidle case, however, seems reluctant to apply the notice requirement to the duty of snow removal. The court did not
require the plaintiff to show that the landlord had notice
of the 'dangerous condition. In this respect the court is limiting the defenses available to a landlord in these circumstances.
The court here may feel that the notice requirement with respect to other obstructions on common ways is still applicable. The important distinction, however, seems to be that with
respect to natural accumulations of snow the requirement of
notice is not so important. A possible basis for this reasoning
may lie in the fact that at the present time there are many
apartment and multiple dwelling units being established and
there is therefore arising a need for a rule which will provide
broad protection to those rightfully using the common ways
of these premises. The landlord is the person responsible
for the presence of such premises and should be ready to
22. The duty to use reasonable care to keep eonon.pasageways reasonably
safe.
28. Langhorne Road Apartments, Inc. v. Bissonj iufta note 16.
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compensate for injuries occurring upon them. He is in a
better position to insure for such occasions. By omitting the

rule that a landlord is not an insurer, the Sidle case seems to
advocate this reasoning.
The court in the Sidle case seems to be moving toward
the requirement of strict liability with respect to landlord's
duty to remove snow. The general trend of the case decisions
also seems to demonstrate this reasoning. The first courts
found no duty of snow removal whatsoever. Then they began
to find such a duty in a limited number of cases. The courts
then moved to a broader extension of the duty by including
it under the landlord's general duty to use reasonable care
with respect to keeping the common ways reasonably safe.
The next logical extension of the rule seems to be the extension to strict liability with the landlord as an insurer for all
,persons rightfully on the common ways of his premises.
W1LLIAM 1. SUTTON
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